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Using administrative panel data on the entire population of new labour immigrants to The 
Netherlands, we estimate the causal effects of labour dynamics on their return decisions. 
Specifically, the roles of unemployment and re-employment spells on immigration durations 
are examined. The endogeneity of labour market outcomes and the return migration decision, 
if ignored, confounds the causal effect. This empirical challenge is addressed using the 
“timing-of-events” method. We estimate the model separately for distinct immigrant groups, 
and find that, overall, unemployment spells shorten immigration durations, while re-
employment spells delay returns for all but one group. The magnitude of the causal effect 
differs across groups. 
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The labour market performance of immigrants in the host country has received ample at-
tention in the empirical literature. Neglected, however, is the question as to what extent
this labour market performance aﬀects the decisions of migrants to return to their source
country. In particular, what is the eﬀect of adverse or positive labour market events such
as the occurrence of unemployment spells and re-employment spells ?1 How does the eﬀect
vary by the duration of the labour market spell ? The failure of the empirical literature
to ask these questions let alone to furnish convincing answers arises from a combination of
methodological challenges and severe limitations of the data usually encountered in migra-
tion analysis.
We address these novel questions using a unique administrative panel for the entire pop-
ulation of recent immigrants to the Netherlands covering the years 1999-2007. These data
characteristics - large size, repeated and accurate measurement - are unique in migration
analysis and enable us to examine durations reliably. The usual data situation is one of
small samples, possibly subject to selectivity and attrition issues, extracted from surveys of
respondent who provide recall data.
This Dutch immigrant register is based on the legal requirement for immigrants to
register with the authorities upon arrival.2 Several other oﬃcial registers are linked by
Statistics Netherlands to this immigrant register, such as the social beneﬁt and the income
register (used by the tax authorities). Sojourn times in labour market states are thus
accurately recorded - they are day exact. Consequently, no data based on individual recall
has to be used, nor do we employ less precise interval estimation techniques for durations.
Moreover, the usual concerns about measurement error are less acute.
Another important feature of our data is the report in the immigrant register of the
immigration motive, also recorded by the authorities upon arrival of the migrant. This
enables us to focus explicitly and exclusively on 94,270 labour immigrants. The immigration
motive is usually latent in standard datasets, and diﬀerent behavioural patterns of labour
and non-labour migrants would confound the empirical analysis. Indeed, the descriptive
analysis of Bijwaard (2010) reveals the substantial extent of non-labour immigration to
The Netherlands (75% of immigration is found to be non-labour related), as well as the
substantial heterogeneity by immigration motive. Finally, the size of our data allows us
to estimate our models separately for distinct immigrant groups deﬁned in terms of their
labour mobility at entry by immigration laws. In particular, we consider immigrants from
sending countries in the EU15 (‘old Europe’), the new EU (the majority of which are Poles
and arrived after 2004); the countries outside Europe are grouped into developed (DCs)
and less developed (LDCs) sending countries.
Turning to the methodological problem of estimating the causal eﬀect of the labour mar-
ket dynamics on the return decision of the immigrant, we need to control for unobserved
correlated heterogeneity in the labour market and migration processes. Otherwise the result-
ing endogeneity confounds the causal impact (below we actually quantify the resulting bias
and reveal it to be substantial). This end is achieved by using the “timing-of-events”method
(Abbring and van den Berg (2003)). In particular, employment, unemployment and migra-
tion durations are modelled as mixed proportional hazards which incorporate correlated
1Existing models of the return decision yield conﬂicting empirical predictions, and are silent about the
eﬀects of such shocks. The two principal opposing paradigms are theories of optimal migration durations
based on preference for source country consumption, and theories of mistaken expectations and immediate
failure on the labour market.
2They are also required to de-register upon leaving. Non-compliers are removed from the register by
administrators. We take this ‘administrative removal’ into account in our modelling, see Section 2.3
2unobservables. The model for the migration duration permits the sojourn times in the vari-
ous labour market states to have causal eﬀects. These are then estimated non-parametrically
using piecewise constant functions.
Having thus overcome the principal empirical challenges by using appropriate estimation
techniques on rich population data on labour immigrants, this paper enlarges the evidence
base for policy makers. As immigration has become a core public concern in most devel-
oped economies, policy makers seek to manage immigrant stocks. Understanding the link
between the labour market and migration processes is fundamental to this end. In particu-
lar, quantifying the (possibly non-linear) eﬀects of unemployment durations on the return
migration decision is relevant to current debates about the ﬁnancial costs, in terms of the
state’s social welfare bill, of “failed” immigrants. Such debates also usually ignore that the
labour market fortunes of these immigrants can be reversed; hence we also consider the
eﬀects of re-employment.
We ﬁnd that, unconditionally, both unemployment and return migration are preva-
lent: between 29% and 37% of labour immigrants experience unemployment spells, and
47% leave the host country during the observation window of 1999 to 2007. Turning to
the causal eﬀects, overall, unemployment spells shorten immigration durations, while re-
employment spells delay returns for all but one group. The magnitude of the causal eﬀects
diﬀer across groups. We further quantify the causal impact of labour market dynamics in
terms of migration durations in several experiments, focussing on the duration and timing
of unemployment spells, and, in a counterfactual analysis, the eﬀect of improved immigrant
“quality”. We ﬁnd that the unemployment durations have a substantial eﬀect, while the
eﬀect of diﬀerences in timing and “quality” are relatively smaller.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We consider brieﬂy the related literature next.
The econometric model is set out in detail in Section 2. In particular, we specify the labour
market and the migration processes, and elucidate the role of unobservable heterogeneity
in Section 2.1. The causal eﬀect is identiﬁed by the argument of Section 2.2. Estimation
proceeds by maximising the likelihood which is spelt out in Section 2.4. The data are
described in Section 3, and the empirical results are presented in Section 4. The last section
concludes. A data appendix provides additional information.
1.1 The related literature
Several theories have been advanced to explain the return decision of migrants, sometimes
with conﬂicting empirical predictions. Since none of these focus on the eﬀects of adverse
or positive labour market shocks during the migration spell, we do not intend to test these
individual theories; their concern is simply diﬀerent. We brieﬂy summarise some prominent
examples from the theoretical literature on the return migration motive for the sake of
completeness.
According to one class of theories, return migration is planned and part of an optimal
strategy to maximise life-time utility. The return of the migrant in e.g. Galor and Stark
(1991) is due to higher preference for consumption in the own country relative to that in the
host country. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) show that return migration may be motivated
by lifetime utility that includes consumption and locationally ﬁxed factors that are comple-
mentary to consumption or diﬀerences in relative prices in host and home country. In this
set up, preference for the home country leads to return even though it is not necessarily
economically advantageous to do so. Another optimal strategy explains return migration as
a result of target savings where individuals migrate temporarily for a period of time where
wages are higher so that they can accumulate savings overseas (Dustmann (2003)). Alter-
natively, individuals may migrate temporarily to acquire skills that are highly rewarded in
3the source country (Dustmann (1997)).
A fundamentally diﬀerent mechanism is based on mistaken expectations about, and
immediate failure on the host country’s labour market, leading to an ‘unplanned’ return
(Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) ). If this mechanism is at work, return migration is expected
to take place relatively soon after arrival in the host country.
Several empirical investigations have attempted to identify the return motive albeit
with mixed conclusions. For example , Yang (2004) ﬁnds evidence in support of the life
cycle explanation. On the other hand Gibson and McKenzie (2009) conclude that the
decision to return is strongly linked to family and lifestyle reasons rather than to the income
opportunities in diﬀerent countries. To repeat, we do not intend to test these theories of the
return migration motive. Rather, we consider the eﬀect labour market shocks experienced
during the immigration.
Closer to our concern is Kirdar (2007) who considers, like us, the eﬀect of unemployment
spells on the return decision. However, his analysis does not address the confounding
selection bias, and is based on a small panel for Germany which exhibits the standard data
characteristics discussed above.
Return migration from The Netherlands has been examined before by Bijwaard (2009,
2010). However, the focus of these descriptive analyses is diﬀerent from ours. Bijwaard (2010)
does not focus on labour migrants, nor uses data on the labour market status of the mi-
grants. He shows that the migration dynamics of recent migrants is substantial, and heavily
depends on the migration motive and the country of birth. Labour migrants and students
are much more prone to leave than family migrants. Bijwaard (2009) considers the corre-
lation between migration decisions and labour market status transitions. But he does not
estimate the causal eﬀect of the labour market process on the return decision, nor does he
take the endogeneity of labour market transitions and migration decisions into account.
2 The econometric model
We seek to determine the causal eﬀect of labour market dynamics on the return migration
intensity of immigrants, so the outcome random variable of interest is the time spent in
the Netherlands. The empirical challenge arises from the potential correlation between
the labour market process and the migration process which, if present and ignored, would
confound the causal eﬀect. We address this endogeneity issue by allowing for correlated
unobservable heterogeneity.
The observational units are labour immigrants in the host country (the Netherlands).
We consider ﬁrst the random time T since ﬁrst entry a certain event takes place: Let Tm
denote the time the immigrant leaves the host country in order to return to the sending
country, Te the time an employment spell ends in the host country, and Tu the time an
unemployment spell ends. We also deﬁne the associated time-varying indicators: the in-
dicator Iu(t) takes value one if the migrant is unemployed at time t, and Ie(t) indicates
that the immigrant is employed again after a period of unemployment. Finally, deﬁne by
δe(t) and δu(t) the sojourn time in the employment and unemployment state. As the mi-
grant is either employed or unemployed, the labour market process is alternating. We thus
have a correlated migration and labour market status process (employed or unemployed),
with three possible transitions: (i) unemployment to employment; Te1,Te2,..., (ii) employ-
ment to unemployment; Tu1,Tu2,..., and (iii) return migration (leaving the Netherlands);
Tm1,Tm2,..., which thus allows for multiple migrations and returns.
The timing of events and our deﬁnitions are illustrated in Figure 1. We depict the labour
market and migration durations of two migrants. In accordance with our data deﬁnitions
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Figure 1: Migration and labour market dynamics
of Section 3, the migrants are employed at the moment they enter the country. Migrant 1










= tu11 − te11. The unemployment spell is terminated at the moment he
leaves the host country at time tm11. Migrant 2 stays for a longer period in the country,









= tu21 − te21 he
becomes employed again. This second employment spell is terminated when he leaves the




= te22 − tu21. The last labour market
spell for each migrant is always censored. While Migrant 1 experiences an adverse labour
market shock (unemployment), Migrant 2 experiences a positive shock (re-employment).
We seek to determine the eﬀect of such shocks, both in terms of their incidences and their
durations, on the duration of the migration spell.
We allow Tm, δe(t) and δu(t) to be correlated through unobservable heterogeneity terms
and through a possible direct eﬀect of labour market dynamics on the migration intensity.
The latter is the causal eﬀect we seek to estimate. To be precise, we express the distributions












. v = (ve,vu,vm) collects the possibly correlated unobservable
heterogeneity terms, which are distributed according to some distribution function G. Time
varying characteristics in state k = {u,e,m} are denoted by xk(t). Conditional on x and
v the distributions of Tu and Te are independent. The migration incidence and the labour
market changes are characterised by the dates they occur, and we are interested in the eﬀect
of the realisation of unemployment, tu, and re-employment, tu on the distribution of Tm.
In particular, we assume that the conditional hazards follow mixed proportional haz-
ard models, given by products of baseline hazards (measuring duration dependence) and






















































λk is the baseline hazard in state k, αk are piecewise constant functions, and the covariates
z in the (return) migration hazard are a subset of the time-varying characteristics of the
migrants x. αu is the causal eﬀect of unemployment, and αe is the causal eﬀect of re-
employment on the migration hazard. By employing piece-wise constant functions, we
allow these eﬀects to exhibit duration dependence.
2.1 Endogeneity: Confounding unobservable heterogeneity
We brieﬂy discuss the important endogeneity issue. It is well known that, due to dynamic
sorting eﬀects, the distribution of vu among those who become unemployed at tu will diﬀer
from its population distribution. In particular, individuals with high ve will tend to enter
unemployment earlier than individuals with low ve. If ve and vm are dependent, then the
distribution vm for unemployed migrants at a given time in the country will diﬀer from the
distribution of vm for migrants still employed. Similarly, if vm and vu are not independent,
then the distribution of vm among unemployed migrants will diﬀer its population distribu-
tion. Therefore, one cannot infer the causal eﬀect of unemployment on the return-migration
from a comparison of the realised durations of those who became unemployed at tu with the
rest of the population, because one would then mix the causal eﬀect of unemployment on
the duration with the diﬀerence in the distribution of vm between these migrants. In this
case Iu(t) and Ie(t) will be endogenous, and Tu,Te and Tm should be modelled jointly to
account for dependence of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. Therefore, we allow vu,ve
and vm to be correlated.
For the sake of parsimoniousness, we assume that each of the unobserved heterogeneity
terms remains the same for recurrent durations of the same type, and we adopt a two-
factor loading model with two independent fundamental factors W1 and W2, both having a
discrete distribution on (−1,1) with pj = Pr(Wj = 1). This implies that
vk = exp(αk1W1 + αk2W2) (4)
with k = {u,e,m}. Let W = (W1,W2)′, v = (ve,vu,vm)′ and A be the matrix of factor
loadings with rows Ak = (αk1,αk2). Then the variance-covariance matrix of the unobserved





2.2 Identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects: The timing-of-events method
The “timing-of-events” method of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) makes the causal ef-










+ ze(t)φe where αk is estimable non-parametrically. To achieve this iden-
tiﬁcation we need to invoke their “no anticipation”assumption. In particular, we assume




for t > tu, and the realisation of te (re-employment) only aﬀects θm for t > te(> tu). This
no-anticipation assumption rules out that migrants, knowing they will become unemployed
(re-employed), will act upon this by leaving the country before they actually become un-
employed (re-employed). Note however, that this does not require migrants to have no
knowledge of the magnitude of the eﬀect of a labour market change, nor to have no knowl-
edge of the precise timing of when this labour market change will occur. It only requires
that migrants do not modify their migration behaviour before the labour market change.
The no-anticipation assumption might fail for a small number of migrants who are on
temporary contracts, and who anticipate their departure in advance. But this potential bias
from anticipation should be small since even for these migrants the migration behaviour is
not ﬁxed in advance as they may renegotiate contract renewal or ﬁnd another job that allows
them to stay in the country. Moreover, the time span between the moment at which the
anticipation occurs and the moment at which the actual labour market change is relatively
short compared to the duration of stay in the country. This is another reason why the
induced bias should be small. See Abbring and van den Berg (2003) for further discussion
of the restrictiveness of this basic identiﬁcation assumption.
2.3 Administrative removal
Some migrants do not oﬃcially inform the authorities that they are about to leave the host
country. The return migration of the non-compliers is coded as an “administrative removal”
by the authorities, once these have concluded that the immigrant has left the municipality,
and has not registered with, and does not show up in the ﬁles of another municipality (this
is further discussed below in data Section 3).
We address this as follows. We assume that the events “administrative removal” and
“zero income at last observed time” imply that the migrant has left before the date the
administrative removal is recorded, and after the last date of any observed change in the
observed characteristics (e.g. labour market status, housing and marital status). Such
limited information is equivalent to interval-censored data. For interval-censored data the
exact end of a duration is unknown, but it is known that the duration ended in some period
of time. If a migrant is administratively removed at duration ta and the last observed
change for this migrant occurred at duration t1 < ta, the contribution to the likelihood (of
the out-migration) of this migrant is the probability of survival till t1 times the probability
that the migrant left the country between t1 and ta. The latter is equal to the survival
from t1 until ta given survival. Consequently, administrative removal has no eﬀect on the
employed part of the likelihood function.
Let aik indicate whether the kth emigration of migrant i was due to an administrative
removal (aik = 1). For an administratively removed migrant we introduce two diﬀerent
event dates: ta
ik is the administrative removal date of the kth emigration of migrant i and
t1
ik < ta




We have data for i = 1,...,n immigrants entering the Netherlands in our observation win-
dow. Let Kie,Kiu and Kim be the number of observed employment, unemployment and
migration spells of individual i. Note that for some migrants Kiu = 0 (e.g. a migrants who
7remains employed). We have three indicators ∆e
ik,∆e
ik and ∆m
ik denoting that kth employ-
ment/unemployment or migration spell is uncensored. Thus the likelihood contribution of


























































































This likelihood naturally separates unemployment, employment, and migration spells, and
for each spell allows for censoring and administrative removal. To simplify notation, we
have suppressed the dependence on observed characteristics in the hazard rates. Iu(t−
ik)
indicates that the migrant is unemployed just before tik and similarly for Ie(t−
il). When
Kiu = 0 the relevant term becomes 1. Note that the last, and only the last, labour market
spell is censored. This is either because the migrant is still in the country at the end of the
observation period or because the migrant has left the country.







where G(ve,vu,vm) is the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms implied
by the discussion of vk given by equation (4).
3 Administrative panel data on the population of immigrants
to The Netherlands
All legal immigration by non-Dutch citizens to the Netherlands is registered in the Central
Register Foreigners (Centraal Register Vreemdelingen, CRV), using information from the
Immigration Police (Vreemdelingen Politie) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(Immigratie en Naturalisatie Dienst, IND). It is mandatory for every immigrant to notify
the local population register immediately after the arrival in the Netherlands if he intends
to stay in for at least two thirds of the forthcoming six months. Our data comprise the
entire population of immigrants who entered during our observation window of 1999-2007,
and after merging in other administrative registers we obtain a panel.
In addition to the date of entry and exit, the administration also records the migration
motive of the individual. Either the motive is coded according to the visa status of the
immigrant, or the immigrant reports the motive upon registration in the population register.
Statistics Netherlands distinguishes between the following motives: labour-migrants, family
8migrants, student immigrants, asylum seekers (and refugees), and immigrants for other
reasons. Note that EU-citizens are required to register in The Netherlands, just as natives
are. See Bijwaard (2010) for an extensive descriptive analysis of the various migration
motives. In particular, about 23% of all non-Dutch immigrants in the age group 18-64 are
labour migrants. Given the subject of the current paper, we focus exclusively on these
labour migrants. As it is possible that the oﬃcial migration motive does not always match
with the true intention of the migrants, we further require that the immigrant be employed
in the Netherlands within three months of their entry.
This immigration register is linked by Statistics Netherlands to the Municipal Regis-
ter of Population (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie, GBA) and to their Social Statistical
Database (SSD). The GBA contains basic demographic characteristics of the migrants, such
as age, gender, marital status and country of origin. From the SSD we have information (on
a monthly basis) on the labour market position, income, industry sector, housing and house-
hold situation. Based on the income source Statistics Netherlands distinguishes nine labour
market categories: employed, self-employed, unemployment beneﬁts, disability beneﬁts, so-
cial security beneﬁts, other beneﬁts, pensions, students and non-participating (no income).
Note that most non-EU immigrants entering during our observation window do not qualify
for social beneﬁts, as eligibility requires suﬃciently long employment or residence durations.
We combine the ﬁrst two labour market categories to deﬁne the individual’s employment
status. All the other categories are aggregated into the unemployed category.
Although in principle the exact date of emigration (and second and repeated immigra-
tion) is known, some migrants do not oﬃcially inform the authorities that they leave. The
departure of these non-complying individuals is registered as an “administrative removal”
after the authorities have assessed that the migrant has left the municipality without show-
ing up in the ﬁles of another municipality in The Netherlands or as an emigrant. These
administrative removals are included among emigration and they amount to around 38%
of all emigrations. 73% of these administrative removed migrants have no observed income
in the country. We conjecture that the majority of these migrants have left the country
shortly after they stopped receiving income (either earnings or beneﬁts). For those who still
have income until they are administratively removed we assume that they left at that exact
date. We have explicitly addressed the issue of administrative removals in the formulation
of the likelihoods above.
To summarise the principal advantages of our data compared to conventional datasets
used in the literature, we have a large panel of the entire population of labour immigrants;
to be exact, we observe 94,270 individuals, 124,075 employment spells, and 59,248 unem-
ployment spells. Other migration types, usually latent, are excluded and do not confound
the empirical analysis which focuses on the eﬀect of labour market dynamics. Income levels
and labour market states are accurately recorded in the administrative data (as they are
used by the authorities for tax and beneﬁt purposes), and the start of the migration spell is
recorded exactly. Moreover, the size of this labour immigrant population allows us to esti-
mate our model separately for distinct migrant groups, rather than conducting a restrictive
pooled analysis. In particular, we distinguish between migrants according to their initial
labour mobility, and thus estimate separate models for migrants from sending countries in
the EU15 (‘old Europe’), the new EU (the majority of which are Poles and arrived after
2004), and the countries outside Europe are grouped into developed (DCs) and less devel-
oped (LDCs) sending countries. In the Data Appendix, we deﬁne these groupings precisely,
and disaggregate these by country of birth.
9Table 1: Descriptive dynamics
EU15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs
Migration dynamics
Mean spell per migrant
Immigration 1.045 1.036 1.023 1.030
Emigration 0.533 0.300 0.601 0.424
Stayer 48.2% 70.9% 40.9% 58.6%
Once emigrated 50.5% 28.2% 58.3% 40.5%
> 1 emigrated 1.4% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0%
In NL at end 51.2% 73.7% 42.3% 60.6%
Length of stay at return migration
< 6 month 3.8% 12.6% 2.3% 5.9%
6 − 12 months 11.0% 19.6% 10.1% 13.3%
12 − 18 months 13.3% 16.8% 12.2% 12.9%
18 − 24 months 12.8% 13.8% 15.0% 13.2%
24 − 60 months 46.6% 30.1% 49.1% 43.8%
> 5 year 12.5% 7.1% 11.3% 10.9%
Average [months] 33.2 24.5 33.2 31.1
Labour market dynamics
Mean spell per migrant
Employment 1.398 1.272 1.115 1.253
Unemployment 0.747 0.497 0.418 0.529
Always employed 49.1% 62.9% 64.0% 62.1%
Once unemployed 36.5% 28.5% 31.9% 28.9%
> 1 unemployed 14.4% 8.6% 4.1% 9.1%
Never re-employed 75.3% 80.9% 91.2% 84.1%
Once re-employed 16.0% 13.8% 7.2% 10.5%
> 1 re-employed 8.7% 5.3% 1.7% 5.4%
103.1 Summary Statistics: Labour immigrants
We proceed to discuss summary statistics for our data relating to the dynamics of migration
and of labour market events. The Data Appendix considers other aspects of the data.
In Table 1 we consider the incidence of return migration, and conditional on returning the
duration of the stay in the Netherlands. Note that the group of ‘stayers’ includes permanent
immigrants, and temporary migrants who have not yet returned. Hence immigrants from
the new EU, having arrived predominantly in the second half of our observation window,
are expected to exhibit a high proportion of censored migration spells. This is borne out in
the data, since the share of stayers from the new EU is 71% whereas for other immigrants
the range is between 41% and 59%. Relatedly, the durations of their completed spells are
shorter. However, a large share of new EU movers (12.6%) leave the Netherlands after
less than 6 months, which is considerably larger than for other immigrant groups. These
diﬀerences highlight already the importance of a analysis disaggregated by sending countries.
Immigrants from the EU15 are more (less) likely to stay than migrants from (less) de-
veloped countries outside the EU, but more likely to be repeat migrants which reﬂects their
unimpeded labour mobility. Conditional on returning, the distribution of completed dura-
tions look fairly similar for these three groups, as do the average duration. Turning to the
unconditional distribution of the immigration duration, Figure 2 depicts the Kaplan Meier
estimates of the survival probabilities by immigrant group. All groups look very similar for
durations up to 24 months. One explanation for the diﬀerences at longer durations are the
lower (higher) staying incidences for non-EU DCs (new EU). Relative to immigrants from
the EU15, fewer immigrants from the latter group stay for longer durations. Overall, both
Table 1 and Figure 2 highlight the importance of the temporary nature of labour migration.
Across all immigrant groups, a substantial proportion leave the Netherlands eventually, and
many do so within 24 months.
Turning to the labour market dynamics, Table 1 reveals that migrants from the EU15,
relative to the other groups, experience greater labour market volatility: during the obser-
vation window they experience a higher incidence of unemployment spells (the mean spell
is 0.7), more employment spells (1.4) and more than one unemployment spell (14.4%), and
the share of the ‘always employed’ is smaller (49%).4
Since we seek to estimate the eﬀects of negative and positive individual labour market
shocks on the migration durations below, we now consider the immigrants by their labour
market status prior to their departure from the host country. Hence Tables 2 and 3 condition
on leaving the host country, whereas Table 1 considered the unconditional labour market
dynamics.
In Table 2 we condition on being unemployed at the time of the return migration.
In line with the results of Table 1, immigrants from the EU15 have a higher incidence
of unemployment at the time of their departure (54%), a higher incidence of repeated
unemployment (21%), and are more likely on average to experience longer unemployment
durations (15 months). By contrast immigrants from DCs outside Europe have, compared
to Europeans, lower incidences of unemployment (41%) and of repeated unemployment
(8%), while their preceding employment spells were longer on average (20 months).
In Table 3 we consider immigrants who, after a period of unemployment, have found
a job and subsequently leave. Hence this group has a volatile labour market experience
(employment, followed by unemployment, followed by re-employment), but the last labour
market spell is a ’positive’ one. Unsurprisingly, the incidence of such labour market histories
is low, ranging between 3 and 10%. Although non-European immigrants from DCs exhibit
4Note that migrants who are always employed, of course, enter the likelihood as censored observations,
and are included in the estimation.
11Figure 2: Kaplan Meier estimates of survival probabilities















































the lowest incidence (3%), the durations of the last two labour market spells look fairly
similar across all groups, except for the newEU immigrants who experience typically shorter
durations.
12Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Unemployed immigrants who leave.
EU15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs
Unemployed at emigration 53.8% 44.0% 40.7% 48.4%
Repeated unemployment 21.2% 15.0% 8.3% 15.9%
Mean # unemployment spells 1.32 1.21 1.10 1.24
Current unemployment duration
< 3 month 18.6% 27.0% 23.3% 20.3%
3 − 6 months 16.0% 22.2% 17.2% 17.2%
6 − 12 months 22.7% 22.5% 19.4% 22.3%
> 1 year 42.7% 28.3% 40.1% 40.2%
Average (months) 15.0 10.8 14.5 13.7
Preceding employment duration
< 3 month 16.5% 17.8% 6.5% 12.0%
3 − 6 months 15.2% 17.8% 10.8% 11.9%
6 − 12 months 45.4% 38.8% 60.0% 53.6%
> 1 year 22.9% 25.6% 22.7% 22.5%
Average (months) 15.5 13.2 20.0 17.8
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Re-employed immigrants who leave.
EU15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs
Re-employed at emigration 7.5% 9.9% 2.8% 4.8%
repeated re-employment 32.0% 30.6% 12.3% 35.4%
Mean # re-employment spells 1.39 1.45 1.16 1.57
Current (re-)employment duration
< 3 month 18.2% 26.9% 16.4% 17.0%
3 − 6 months 16.7% 21.8% 15.9% 17.3%
6 − 12 months 23.8% 22.8% 26.2% 23.9%
> 1 year 41.3% 28.5% 41.5% 41.8%
Average (months) 14.8 10.5 13.9 14.3
Preceding unemployment duration
< 1 month 18.4% 22.3% 11.3% 21.0%
1 − 2 months 18.1% 18.6% 17.9% 13.3%
2 − 3 months 17.2% 19.7% 17.4% 19.9%
3 − 6 months 20.5% 19.5% 19.1% 22.4%
6 − 12 months 17.1% 13.0% 25.6% 15.6%
> 1 year 8.7% 6.9% 8.7% 7.8%
Average (months) 5.1 4.3 6.2 4.9
134 Results
We consider three versions of our model given by equations (1) to (3). Recall that the





+ zk(t)φk with k ∈ {u,e}. In Model 1 the causal eﬀects are assumed constant
across time and migrants and thus given by γu and γe (with αk ≡ φk ≡ 0). In Model 2
the covariate eﬀect is still forced to zero, but the causal eﬀects of sojourn times are allowed
to exhibit duration dependence. This is implemented non-parametrically by modelling the
sequence {αk} as piece-wise constant functions. In Model 3 we further allow the eﬀect to
be heterogeneous across migrants in terms of zu and ze which measure demographics and
previous labour market history. For the sake of expositional clarity, we present separately
the eﬀect of the unemployment and the re-employment spells, although it is clear from
equation (6) that these are estimated simultaneously. For the sake of brevity, we do not
discuss the coeﬃcients of the covariates xk which are only of secondary importance.5 First
we discuss the coeﬃcients in the context of the return migration hazard. To facilitate the
interpretation of the coeﬃcients, we consider in Section 4.3 several illustrative examples
which focus on the survival probabilities.
5The estimates are, of course, available from the authors. The covariates include extensive measures of
demographics, a non-parametric function of income, housing descriptors, sector dummies, and controls for
macro eﬀects.
14Table 4: The estimated causal eﬀect of becoming unemployed on return migration hazards
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EU 15 new EU non-EU EU 15 new EU non-EU EU 15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs DCs LDCs DCs LDCs
Constant eﬀect [γu] 0.638∗∗ 0.670∗∗ 0.464∗ 0.667∗∗
(0.076) (0.165) (0.185) (0.193)
Duration dependence [αu]:
(0-3 months) 0.633∗∗ 0.586∗∗ 0.663∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 0.834∗∗ 1.169∗∗ 0.403∗ 0.672∗∗
(0.078) (0.171) (0.178) (0.197) (0.085) (0.206) (0.192) (0.205)
(3-6 months) 0.728∗∗ 0.877∗∗ 0.564∗∗ 0.797∗∗ 0.963∗∗ 1.401∗∗ 0.323 0.795∗∗
(0.080) (0.175) (0.181) (0.202) (0.087) (0.209) (0.194) (0.208)
(6-12 months) 0.650∗∗ 0.657∗∗ 0.068 0.777∗∗ 0.915∗∗ 1.133∗∗ −0.158 0.740∗∗
(0.081) (0.180) (0.183) (0.207) (0.088) (0.212) (0.196) (0.209)
(> 1 year) 0.662∗∗ 0.681∗∗ −0.224 1.035∗∗ 1.000∗∗ 1.025∗∗ −0.433∗ 0.991∗∗
(0.086) (0.194) (0.181) (0.223) (0.093) (0.216) (0.196) (0.220)
Labour market history [φu]:
Repeated unemployment −0.179∗∗ −0.388∗ −0.017 −0.432∗∗
(0.056) (0.196) (0.218) (0.136)
Order of unemployment spell −0.184∗∗ 0.001 −0.178 −0.112
(0.031) (0.123) (0.166) (0.075)
Duration of previous
employment spell:
< 3 m. −0.301∗∗ −0.408∗∗ 0.132 −0.106
(0.042) (0.110) (0.119) (0.100)
3 − 6 m. −0.323∗∗ −0.234∗ 0.147 −0.173
(0.042) (0.098) (0.085) (0.094)
> 1 yr −0.313∗∗ −0.274∗∗ 0.062 −0.176∗
(0.035) (0.088) (0.062) (0.071)
Notes: The model equations are given by (1) to (3), the likelihood is given by (6). SE in parentheses. ∗ : p < 0.05 and ∗∗ : p < 0.01. Model 3 covariates (z)
also include demographics (sex, married, number of children, and age group dummies). Reference category for employment durations: 3 − 6 months. ‘order of
unemployment spell’ refers to the second, third etc. unemployment spell.
1
54.1 The causal eﬀects of becoming unemployed on return migration haz-
ards
The estimated causal eﬀects of unemployment spells on return migration hazards are re-
ported in Table 4. Across all three speciﬁcations and all immigrant groups it is evident that
unemployment dynamics shorten migration durations.
The average eﬀect γu for the all groups of immigrants is substantial and essentially of
the same magnitude, the point estimates ranging from 0.46 to 0.67. Models 2 and 3 reveal
that the causal eﬀect exhibits duration dependence. For EU migrants, the impact peaks
for durations of 3-6 months.6 For non-EU migrants, the picture is more heterogeneous, as
duration dependence increases for immigrants from LDCs, whereas the coeﬃcients become
smaller for the others. Further permitting the causal eﬀect to vary across characteristics
(demographics and labour market history) increases the magnitude of the duration eﬀects for
EU immigrants. This follows, in particular, since the duration of the preceding employment
spell lengthens the migration spell. By contrast, the eﬀect of the previous labour market
history is found to be insigniﬁcant for non-EU DC immigrants.
4.2 The causal eﬀects of becoming re-employed on return migration haz-
ards
Finding employment after a period of unemployment is a positive labour market event
which is likely to impact also on migration durations. Table 5 reports the results. For all
except new EU immigrants, the eﬀect of having found employment after an unemployment
spell delays the migrant’s return. The eﬀect is particularly strong for immigrants from
developed countries outside the EU. Previous unemployment durations only exhibit an
eﬀect if these were no longer than 3 months, indicating that such unemployment spells were
anomalies which were quickly overcome by the individual. The one immigrant group which
deviates from this pattern of extended migration durations are immigrants from the new
EU, i.e. predominantly Polish immigrants. The estimated causal impact of re-employment
for this group, however, is consistent with target savings: having re-gained employment, it
is plausible that such immigrants are back on track to reach their savings target and return
once this has been attained.
6The point estimates in Model 3 for EU15 for 3-6 months, .963, and in excess of 1 year, 1.0, are statistically
not distinguishable.
16Table 5: Estimated causal eﬀect of re-employment on return migration hazards.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
EU 15 new EU non-EU EU 15 new EU non-EU EU 15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs DCs LDCs DCs LDCs
Constant eﬀect [γe] −0.118∗∗ 0.252∗∗ −0.441∗∗ −0.161∗
(0.037) (0.067) (0.108) (0.080)
Duration dependence [αe]:
(0-3 months) −0.095 0.281∗ −0.271 −0.309∗ −0.081 0.339 −0.178 −0.291
(0.063) (0.111) (0.181) (0.146) (0.080) (0.204) (0.250) (0.182)
(3-6 months) 0.109 0.441∗∗ −0.122 0.041 0.143 0.536∗∗ −0.041 0.098
(0.063) (0.119) (0.182) (0.144) (0.081) (0.208) (0.251) (0.181)
(6-12 months) 0.063 0.202 −0.105 −0.016 0.118 0.333 −0.042 0.072
(0.055) (0.116) (0.143) (0.127) (0.075) (0.209) (0.225) (0.168)
(> 1 year) −0.295∗∗ 0.138 −0.598∗∗ −0.288∗∗ −0.197∗∗ 0.334 −0.554∗∗ −0.106
(0.046) (0.107) (0.115) (0.108) (0.070) (0.209) (0.208) (0.154)
Labour market history [φe]:
Repeated re-employment 0.040 0.218 −0.281 0.224
(0.085) (0.201) (0.496) (0.190)
Order of re-employment spell (> 1) −0.139∗∗ −0.025 −0.107 −0.041
(0.045) (0.114) (0.336) (0.095)
On beneﬁt −0.446∗∗ −0.881∗∗ 0.108 −0.575∗∗
(0.084) (0.313) (0.271) (0.210)
Duration of previous
unemployment spell:
< 1 m. −0.382∗∗ −0.323∗ −0.085 −0.246
(0.077) (0.162) (0.277) (0.169)
1 − 2 m. −0.279∗∗ −0.139 0.221 −0.600∗∗
(0.077) (0.169) (0.241) (0.191)
2 − 3 m. −0.172∗ 0.041 −0.056 −0.225
(0.077) (0.167) (0.242) (0.170)
6 − 12 m. 0.032 −0.196 0.178 −0.301
(0.078) (0.186) (0.219) (0.183)
> 1 yr 0.108 −0.156 −0.449 −0.161
(0.098) (0.232) (0.295) (0.235)
Notes: As for Table 4.
1
74.3 Impacts on immigration durations
We proceed to illustrate the impact of labour market histories on immigration durations.
Speciﬁcally, we take the coeﬃcient estimates of the return migration hazard models λm and
consider, for each immigrant group, several labour market proﬁles. For simplicity, we ab-
stract ﬁrst from observable individual heterogeneity and focus on the ‘reference’ immigrant
by setting the covariate coeﬃcients βm
x , φu, and φe in equation (3) to zero. The object







expectation is taken over unobserved heterogeneity vm, recalling that Tm is the sojourn
time in the host country. We consider variations in unemployment durations, in the timing
of unemployment spells, and conclude with an analysis of counterfactuals.
4.3.1 The impact of unemployment durations
We compare the impact of unemployment durations of 3, 12, and 24 months, whereupon
immigrants, who are still in the host country, experience a reversal of fortunes and ﬁnd
employment again. To ensure comparability, all unemployment spells start three months
after entry into the Netherlands.
Figure 3 depicts the results for immigrants from the EU15 and from the non-European
LDCs. The three vertical lines indicate the end of the respective unemployment spell, and
thus also indicate the time interval where survival probabilities coincide since unemployment
spells coincide. To facilitate the comparison between the survival probabilities, we also plot
in the left panel the diﬀerence between the survival probabilities associated with the longer
unemployment durations and with the duration of 3 months.
The ﬁgure illustrates again, ﬁrst that unemployment spells shorten survival probabilities,
and second that the magnitude of the impact increases in the unemployment duration.
Relative to the survival probabilities associated with the 3 month unemployment spell, the
largest diﬀerence occurs at the time the respective unemployment spell comes to an end (at
times 3+12 and 3+24 months), whence survival probabilities start to converge again.
Finally, the ﬁgure also illustrates the diﬀerence between the diﬀerent immigrant groups,
both in terms of the absolute values of the survival probabilities (left panels), as well as
the relative diﬀerences (right panels). In particular, the maximal diﬀerence in survival
probabilities for immigrants from the EU15 (LDCs) for unemployment durations 3 and 12
is 0.06 (0.1), and for the unemployment durations of 3 and 24 months is 0.14 (0.23). Hence
the impact of longer unemployment durations from immigrants from LDCs is substantially
larger.
18Figure 3: The eﬀect of unemployment spells on survival probabilities
























































































































































































































194.3.2 The eﬀect of the timing of the unemployment spell
Figure 4: The eﬀect of the timing of unemployment spells on survival probabilities
























































































In order to assess the eﬀect of the timing of an unemployment spell, we consider spells
of a common length of 6 months, with start times at 3, 6, 9, and 12 months after entry into
the Netherlands. Figure 4 displays the results. For survivals of at least 20 months, it is
clear that while later starts of the unemployment spells have larger impacts on the survival
probabilities, the diﬀerences are fairly small. For instance, for immigrants from the EU15,
the maximal diﬀerence between the survival probabilities associated with the earliest and
the latest start of the unemployment spell is .06, whereas this becomes .08 for immigrants
from LDCs. Hence this diﬀerence between the immigrant groups is fairly small.
4.3.3 Counterfactual analysis
As policy makers in developed host countries often seek to attract higher ‘quality’ immi-
grants, it is of interest to consider the impact of imputed ‘quality improvements’ on survival
probabilities by essentially comparing outcomes for immigrants from non-European LDCs
with average LDC characteristics and with average DC characteristics (holding thus con-
stant the covariate coeﬃcients of the return migration hazard model). Compared to the two
previous exercises, the coeﬃcient vector βm
x is not zero and given by the estimates for the
model for immigrants from LDCs. Average covariate values are reported in Table 8 in the
Data Appendix. In particular, we consider single male wage earners in the service sector
who do not own a house, who are averaged aged (31.6 vs. 35), and who earn average wages
when employed (e2,751 vs. e5,476).
While covariates have a direct impact on survivals, they also, of course, aﬀect unemploy-
ment propensities. To isolate the direct covariate eﬀect, in Figure 5 the lines labelled ‘LDC’
20Figure 5: Counterfactual analysis: LDC immigrants with average DC characteristics













































and ‘DC’ depict the survival probabilities for LDC immigrants with the respect covariate
proﬁle who are continuously employed. The additional unemployment eﬀect is indicated by
the line ‘+u’ and computed as follows: Based on the results of Tables 1 and 2, we compute
the expected survival probability, weighted by the probability of being always employed
(62.1% vs. 64%). For the survival probability conditional on having been unemployed,
we assume that the unemployment spell starts at the average ﬁrst employment length (17
months), and lasts the average length (13 months). As Table 2 revealed, there is little
diﬀerence between immigrants from LDCs and DCs in terms of the last two outcomes.
Figure 5 reveals that the unemployment eﬀect is very small, and the diﬀerence in proﬁles
is driven by the direct covariate eﬀect, which is dominated by the diﬀerence in average
earnings. If the considered average immigrant from LDCs were to earn, on average, as
immigrants from DCs when employed, then immigration durations would be shorter, but
the reduction in survival probability would not exceed 13 percentage points. It is in this
sense that improved immigrant ‘quality’ would reduce immigration durations.
214.4 Selectivity biases
We brieﬂy illustrate the consequences of ignoring the endogeneity issue induced by the
correlations between the unobservable heterogeneity terms (ve,vu,vm) given by distribution
G. Recall that we have modelled this by equation (4). We quantify the resulting selectivity
biases in terms of the principal objects of interest, namely the point estimates of the causal
eﬀects on return migration hazards. For the sake of brevity, we illustrate the issue in
the context of Model 1, i.e. the estimate of the constant causal eﬀect given by γk with
k ∈ {u,e}.7 Table 6 reports the results.
It is evident that ignoring the endogeneity results in positive biases of the causal eﬀect of
unemployment for all groups except the non-EU DC group; in the case of re-employment,
the causal eﬀects are also reduced in magnitude. In the former case, the biases range
between 9% and 33 %, in the latter case the range is from 34% to 46% except for non-EU
LDCs in which case the bias factor is close to 2.5. We conclude that not controlling for
selectivity results in substantial biases.
Table 6: Analysis of selectivity biases on the eﬀect on return-migration hazards
EU 15 new EU non-EU EU 15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs DCs LDCs
Unemployment Re-employment
Timing of .638∗∗ .670∗∗ .464∗ .667∗∗ −.118∗∗ .252∗∗ −.441∗∗ −.161∗
Events model (.076) (.165) (.185) (.193) (.037) (.067) (.108) (.080)
PH-model .771∗∗ .787∗∗ .318 .673∗∗ −.179∗∗ .177∗∗ −.345∗∗ −.397∗∗
(.065) (.154) (.163) (.152) (.026) (.061) (.076) (.060)
MPH-model .851∗∗ .820∗∗ .440∗ .732∗∗ −.162∗∗ .187∗∗ −.301∗∗ −.384∗∗
(.069) (.156) (.173) (.158) (.028) (.062) (.080) (.130)
Notes:
∗p < 0.05 and
∗∗p < 0.01. PH refers to the P(roportional)H(azard)-model. The
M(ixed)P(roportional)H(azard)-model has a discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution, and is given
by (3) alone with αu = αe = φu = φe = 0 and thus ignores the correlation with the error terms appearing
in equations (1) and (2) .
5 Conclusion
The majority of recent labour immigration to the Netherlands is temporary rather than
permanent. Across all immigrant groups, a substantial proportion leave the host coun-
try eventually, and many do so within 24 months. We have considered in this paper the
individual labour market drivers of immigration durations.
Despite this extent of temporary immigration, the interdependence of labour market
events and immigration durations has received little attention in the empirical literature,
mainly because of severe data limitations. We have addressed this gap using a unique Dutch
administrative panel of the entire population of recent labour immigrants. Hence the usual
concerns about immigrant data (small samples, missing covariates, latent migrant types,
inaccurate measurement and recall) are absent, as we observe entry, exit, migration motive,
and complete labour market histories. Moreover, the large size of the data enables us to
estimate separate models for distinct immigrant groups, and we have shown the importance
of controlling for observable migrant heterogeneity.
7For the sake of brevity, we do not report estimates of the factor loaders, and the implied covariances.
These are, of course, available from the authors.
22The principal methodological challenge arises, however, from unobservable heterogene-
ity that is correlated across the migration and the labour market processes. The timing of
events method enables us to control for the selectivity of returnees, and thus to identify and
estimate the causal eﬀects of employment and unemployment histories on migration dura-
tions. Simpler models which ignore error correlations across labour market and migration
processes are shown to exhibit substantial selection biases.
Overall, we have found that, across all immigrant groups, unemployment dynamics
shorten the migration duration, while employment spells following unemployment spell de-
lay the return for all migrants except for those from the new EU countries. The causal
impact of labour market dynamics is quantiﬁed in terms of migration durations in several
experiments, focussing on the duration and timing of unemployment spells, and, in a coun-
terfactual analysis, the eﬀect of improved immigrant “quality”. These experiments show
that the unemployment durations have a substantial eﬀect, while the eﬀect of diﬀerences in
timing and “quality” are relatively smaller.
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A Data Appendix
Table 7 explains the sub-populations of labour immigrants, and disaggregates these accord-
ing to the country of birth. For countries outside the EU, we distinguish between developed
(DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs). Among the EU15, immigrants from the UK
and Germany predominate, for the new EU 69% are Polish immigrants. In the non-EU
group, the three largest subgroups are from the USA, India and Japan. Overall immigrants
from non-EU LDCs are the second largest group.
This grouping also corresponds to the varying degrees of labour mobility among the four
groups. Immigrants from the EU15 can move freely in the Dutch labour market, as can,
since 2004, immigrants from the new EU except for Bulgarians and Rumanians. All non-EU
24migrants need a work permit (the “Machtiging Voorlopig Verblijf (MVV)” or “Regular Pro-
visional Residence Permit”). LDCs and DCs diﬀer in that immigrants from these DCs are
exempted from obtaining this MVV before entry. To obtain a work permit, three conditions
must be met: (i) the presence of prioritised supply (i.e. a labour market check), and the
recruitment eﬀorts of the employer to ﬁll the position with a native; (ii) renumeration in
accordance with the market, and at least at the level of the statutory minimum wage; (iii)
having secured adequate accommodation. Although self-employed migrants are exempted
from the work permit requirement, residence permits are only granted if the authorities
deem that the immigrant would serve ‘vital’ Dutch interest. The passage of time increase
labour mobility of non-EU immigrants. In particular, the migrant will be entirely free to
work on the Dutch labour market after 3 years of residence on the basis of a residence
permit to perform work. After 5 years of residence the migrant can apply for a permanent
residence permit (or citizenship).
Table 7: Major country of birth
EU 15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs
UK 27.4% Poland 69.1% USA 38.5% India 19.2%
Germany 18.5% Romania 10.1% Japan 26.8% China 10.2%
France 9.3% Czechoslovakia 7.4% Australia 10.1% South Africa 7.8%
Portugal 8.4% Hungary 6.0% Canada 8.1% Brasil 3.7%
Italy 8.2% Bulgaria 5.4% South Korea 4.9% Taiwan 3.5%
Belgium 7.1% Lithuania 0.8% Norway 4.1% Morocco 2.9%
Spain 5.7% Switzerland 3.8% rest Africa 17.6%
Greece 4.3% New Zealand 3.1% rest Asia 13.9%





N = 48,290 12,717 11,746 16,974
Table 8 reports some summary statistics for the sub-populations. The migrant groups
look fairly similar in terms of the age distribution and occupational choices. Relative to EU
migrants, non-EU DC migrants are more often male, married, less often own a house, and
have a substantially larger share among the highest income group (recall that we require
that the labour immigrant be employed at ﬁrst entry). Remarkable about migrants from the
new EU states (69% of whom are Polish) is the fact that earnings are fairly homogeneous,
with 36% in the ﬁrst and 44% in the second income group.
25Table 8: Descriptive statistics at ﬁrst entry
EU15 new EU non- EU
DCs LDCs
# of migrants 48,290 12,717 11,746 16,974
Female 33.1% 29.6% 22.2% 23.3%
Single 80.3% 72.7% 56.8% 71.3%
Married 17.1% 25.9% 42.2% 27.5%
Divorced 2.5% 1.3% 0.9% 1.2%
Other origin 16.2% 15.4% 19.6% 37.0%
Age
18–25 20.5% 26.1% 9.5% 16.0%
25–30 29.7% 31.0% 22.7% 31.9%
30–35 21.1% 18.0% 22.4% 23.0%
35–40 12.4% 10.0% 17.3% 13.1%
40–45 7.6% 6.9% 12.0% 8.2%
45–50 4.5% 5.0% 7.8% 4.6%
50–55 2.7% 2.2% 5.3% 2.2%
55–60 1.2% 0.7% 2.5% 0.8%
60–65 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.2%
Average 31.3 30.3 35.0 31.6
Housing
house owned 34.1% 33.9% 27.4% 28.1%
value house < 100k 30.6% 19.5% 14.9% 26.7%
value house 100–200k 38.0% 36.3% 37.8% 37.5%
value house 200–300k 13.0% 16.1% 19.8% 15.6%
value house 300–400k 5.2% 6.0% 10.7% 5.4%
value house > 400k 5.3% 8.1% 10.6% 6.4%
26Table 8: Descriptive statistics at ﬁrst entry (continued)
EU15 new EU non-EU
DCs LDCs
monthly income
< 0 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1%
0 - 1000 32.5% 35.9% 21.5% 31.1%
1000 - 2000 26.2% 44.2% 12.0% 24.0%
2000 - 3000 18.2% 12.3% 12.7% 16.8%
3000 - 4000 7.6% 3.7% 8.9% 9.9%
4000 - 5000 3.9% 1.3% 6.8% 5.2%
5000 - 6000 2.9% 0.7% 6.0% 3.2%
> 6000 8.5% 1.4% 31.9% 9.7%
Average e2517 e1484 e5476 e2751
Sector
Agriculture 1.1% 5.7% 0.4% 1.2%
Industry 11.9% 9.6% 12.5% 8.9%
Construction 1.8% 1.9% 0.5% 0.6%
Catering 6.3% 2.1% 3.8% 4.2%
Trade 13.4% 9.9% 20.1% 10.8%
Transport 5.2% 3.5% 7.1% 3.8%
Finance 3.0% 1.8% 5.9% 3.7%
Services 42.5% 43.7% 33.9% 49.5%
Education 6.0% 5.5% 6.7% 10.1%
Care 2.8% 1.8% 2.0% 3.0%
Nonproﬁt 2.9% 1.7% 5.5% 2.6%
27